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De-regulations Double: Arups, Fire Safety and the Meta-engineering of Architectural 
Practice. 
 
1. From ‘Total Design’ to Meta-Engineering 
 
They’re the people you go to when you want to know how quickly you can 
dismantle the wreckage of the World Trade Centre, and dump it in the New Jersey 
Meadowlands; by modelling the heat of the inferno, and the thermal capacity of the 
structural steels, they can estimate the current temperature of each member, its 
likely rate of cooling, and the date on which it will be safe for the wrecking-crew to 
handle it.  They’re also the people you go to when you want to know what time of 
day to erect the CCTV building; the structural steels have been left out in the sun, 
subject to variable solar gain, but by calculating the differential expansion of each 
member, they can tell you which ones need to be coupled at dawn, when they’re 
both cool.    
 
 These calculation may be the stock-in-trade for engineers at Arup’s 
Associates - the worlds biggest building-design consultancy - but if we trust Rem 
Koolhaas, they are also indicative instances of the ‘post-modernity’ of contemporary 
engineering. Koolhaas suggests that, through their fastidious devotion to the 
empirical – enabled and mediated by the ‘hypnotic window’ of the computer – these 
engineers have abandoned any modernist concern for universalizing structural 
principles, or their didactic expression: “once avid supporters of High Tech, 
modernism's moment of decadence, [Arups are],  - in a form of emancipation - now 
exploring a kind of science fiction, meta-engineering as a total answer to 
everything'"i .  The meta-project which Arup’s have been pursuing in the background 
of architectural culture is the de-construction of every structural or architectural 
principle, by assuring us that anything and everything is (technically) possible.  
 
  This extension of Arup’s ‘Total Design’ii into ‘meta-engineering’iii is given 
more substance by Arindam Dutta’s article ‘Marginality and Meta-engineering: 
Keynes and Arups’iv.  Again noting the way that the firms work has charted a loss of 
faith with concerns for structural ‘honesty’ or ‘economy’ – which Dutta associates 
with classical economic concepts of ‘thrift’ – he suggests we understand Arup’s 
recent work as the realization of Keynesian economic and aesthetic principles.  The 
global rash of ‘signature’ architectural projects Arup’s delivered during the nineties 
and noughties were, at the economic level, targeted stimuli by Sovereign wealth 
funds occupying the vacuum of public dis-investment.  But Dutta suggests that the 
sheer structural extravagance of these buildings (in the UK we might think of those 
Lottery-funded projects of the period – the Eden Project, the Lowry Museum, the 
London Eye, the ArcelorMittal Orbit) did more than simply represent the calculatedly 
irrational optimism of Blairite economics; it was also a means for Arup’s to re-
engineer the legislative framework of building practices.  Dutta shows how in order 
to deliver these projects, Arups extended its services from those of mere 
engineering, to include development accountancy, international legal-advise, and 
even the review and drafting of governmental legislation.  The object of design for 
these engineers, according to Dutta, is no longer the building as such; rather, 
buildings simply represent the “’front end’ of an infrastructural project whose 
impetus is to transform the modalities of governmentality as such” v.    
 
This talk continues the line of thought outlined here by Koolhaas and Dutta 
considering the initiatives of Arup’s Associates to re-engineer the conditions of 
contemporary architectural and governmental practice.  Its specific lens is a sub-field 
of consultancy offered by Arups, that of fire-safety engineering.  It seeks to show 
how Arup’s have been instrumental in the development of this new discipline; to 
illustrate how the rationalities of this discipline have been shaped by the concerns of 
contemporary building design; and so to show how concerns of building design have 
in turn become drivers within a re-engineering of broader legal and political 
framework.  That is, the talk suggest that specific modernist architectural motifs – 
the open plan, the exposed structural frame – have become actors within a set of 
governmental transformations we recognize as part of the neo-liberal turn; the 
deconstruction of the state and its replacement with marketized services; the 
collapse in universalist social security through the concept of individualized risk; and 
the replacement of transparent knowledge frameworks with conditions of ‘creative’ 
uncertainty.   
 
2: From Technologies of Solidarity to Technologies of Speculation 
 
The problem of fire offers, of course, an important historical link between 
questions of governance and questions of architectural design. In the UK, for 
instance, the Great Fire of London is often cited as the focusing event that 
necessitated our first building regulations. More broadly, though, we could say that 
the experience of urban fire has been an important legitimator of governmental 
action, and one that has led to the gradual collectivization of risk through specific 
technologies of ‘solidarity’vi.  In rural pre-reformation Scotland fire was generally 
understood to be a matter of personal responsibility, if not divine retribution, and it 
was only the intensification of risk through urban settlement that generated a call 
need for regulation.  In 1426 James I imposed a curfew (couvre-feu) on the city of 
Edinburgh, banning the carrying of fire by night, and stopping ‘common women’ 
entering the city (the untended fires of aroused men were understood to be the 
source of inflammation in this Calvinist govern-mentality).  By the 17th Century, 
Scotland’s Royal Burgh’s were fully established as legal and responsibility-bearing 
agents, and in Edinburgh instituted the first building codes as a means to limit 
vertical spread of flame, at the same time as developing the cities first “Company for 
Quenching Fires”.  During the 18th Century, the birth of the Insurance industry drove 
innovation in the field, through commercial risk-spreading societies and associated 
private-enterprise brigades.  But by the early 19th C. this privatized system had come 
to be seen as counterproductive - uninsured buildings could not be allowed to burn 
unchecked – and in 1824 Edinburgh established the UK’s first full-time municipal 
fire-fighting service, empowered to grant permission for building designs on the 
basis of fire-prevention and rescue. By the 20th C, through the conscription of fire-
fighters within WWII, and the industrialization of post-war reconstruction, the fire-
services and building regulatory frameworks were made national and mandatory. 
Arguments for the de-regulation of fire-safety knowledge were developing in 
parallel to the birth of these universalizing standards, however.  It was recognized by 
both the government and the scientists of the day that existing codes and standards 
were a patchwork of reactive regulations, based on the often arbitrary contingencies 
of past events:  The British Standards for safe egress time, for instance (which 
determine the size of any single ‘compartment’), insist that occupants should be able 
to escape from a building in the duration of the British National Anthem, due to a 
single well publicized fire in which 3000 theatre-goers reportedly escaped while the 
band played; the British Standard Fire Test, used to determine the amount of fire-
protection required around a structure, is based on the progress of a blaze measured 
in the fire-box of a Victorian steam-locomotive, an index of the speed in which 
Navvies can shovel coal, but completely unrepresentative of any building firevii.  
Recognising that future construction should not be hindered by the arbitrary details 
of past fires, the UK government set up the Fire Research Station at Borehamwood 
in 1949.  The ambition of the Station was to develop a scientific basis for the 
modelling of fire behavior, and its work provided the basis for the development of 
Fire Safety Engineering as both an academic discipline and a field of consultancy.  
David Rasbach, who began his career at Borehamwood, establish the world’s first 
Fire Safety Engineering programme at the University of Edinburgh.  Margaret Law, a 
colleague of Rasbach’s, established the world’s first fire-safety consultancy with 
Arups.   
Law was influential in establishing the productive tension that exists between 
the rationalities of fire-safety science, and those of fire-safety regulation.  In ‘Magic 
Numbers and Golden Rules’ she outlines her critique of existing prescriptive 
standards, both on the basis of their arbitrary science, but also for concealing lazy 
govern-mentalities: “the regulatory authorities are comfortable with [these] magic 
numbers. If the distance to a door is no more than 45 m, the building is safe. They 
need to think no further.” The regulatory attitude also brings – in Laws account – a 
risk-averse restrictive texture to academic research: “the transfer of technology from 
the researcher to the real world is subject to a ratchet mechanism. Because fire 
research is almost entirely bound up with safety issues, there is an inherent prejudice 
in favor of releasing and applying results at the earliest stage if lives can thereby be 
saved…” while no such pressure exists to disseminate “research carried out which 
shows that the current approaches to fire safety may be overly restrictive”.  To 
counter these perceived problems, she argues for a fire-safety science whose 
principle aim is to de-regulate fire-safety thinking, basing it on empirical, 
performance-based calculations, that facilitate design flexibility: “as soon as [rules] 
frustrate design, we should be able to re-establish the rationale behind 
the rules and thereby develop new approaches”. Echoing Arup’s own notion of ‘Total 
Design’ Law argued against the establishment of universal standards for safety, and 
for a flexible empirical approach that would allow safety to be understood as 
another design case-load, balanced against financial, political or aesthetic concerns. 
 
3. The Political Economy of Exposed Structural Steel 
 
We can understand how the intersection between architectural and 
governmental thinking developed through the emergence of fire-safety engineering 
by looking at a sequence of influential projects from the perspective of fire-safety, 
and considering the way in which their design innovations drove changes in the 
legislature.   
As recently as the 1960’s, the rationalities of fire-safety seemed quite 
anathema to those of architecture. Mies’ Seagram building (1958) – and all of his 
later American corporate projects –realized their ambitions for aesthetic simplicity 
and structural honesty through the application of stuck-on decorative columns, so 
inconceivable was it to have a unprotected structural steel frame.  However, by the 
1970’s, with Margaret Law installed at Arups, this changed.  Law developed means 
to achieve required fire ratings through the massivity of structural members, and 
through water-cooled hollow-sections, and she deployed both of these strategies at 
the Pompidou Centre (1971-77).  At Beauborg, Law also used the offset of structure 
from envelope as a fire-safety strategy; the Pompidou’s water-cooled compression 
columns are set 1.6 metres outside of the glazing, with the slender tensile members 
pushed a further 7.6 metres by the massive ‘petit gerberettes’ (Law frustrated Piano 
and Rogers ambition for a totally open and flexible interior space, however; 
recognizing that members close to the window would be lost in a fire, each floor had 
to be divided into two fire-compartments to minimize loss of structural stability).  
Arups pushed this logic further in a parallel project, Bush Lane House (1971-74), for 
which it was also the Architect, where the whole primary structure is pushed out-
board of the envelope, leaving open and uncompartmentalised interior floorplates. 
The 1980’s brought two developments which put Fire Safety Engineers in 
more general demand.  Thatchers de-regulation of the financial services sector – her 
‘Big Bang’ – created an enormous demand for office space within the City of London.  
The fashion for Atria within these building brought about a commensurate de-
regulation of aspects of architectural design, presenting legislators with challenges 
for which they did not yet have rules.  At Lloyds of London (1978-86) – where 
structural concrete was still required so as to avoid fire-protection to the exposed 
interior frame - Arups pioneered the use of Computational Fluid Dynamics to model 
smoke and fire behavior within the Atrium, and so gain relaxations on the 
requirement for compartmentation. The professional regulatory context was also 
shifting, with the Monopolies and Mergers commission and the later Warne Report 
disbanding architects fee scales and protection of function.  The development of 
Design and Build contracting opened up new forms of procurement within which the 
architect was no longer needed as lead designer, and in which engineers might take 
the role of lead designer.  Due to their ability to relax or contravene regulatory 
requirements, Firms offering Fire-Safety consultancy developed a significant market 
advantage.  The ability to design large open-plan structures with exposed structural 
steel offered significant cost saving in the context of warehouse design, and became 
key design-drivers within ambitions to ‘Value Engineer’ such structures.   
In the 1990’s and early Noughties, as we have noted, Arups established a 
reputation as a delivery firm for international projects by ‘signature’ architectural 
firms.  The self-consciously transgressive architectural proposals of Gehry, Hadid, 
Koolhaas et al provided design challenges which further critiqued existing regulatory 
frameworks, securing the apparent demand for a performance-based approach to 
safety.  The Seattle Central Library – in which Koolhaas deployed his ironically 
compliant technique of pushing the building volume to the maximum permitted by 
zoning regulation – he nonetheless broke all of Seattle codes for egress, 
compartmentation and smoke control.  Again, detailed computational fire-scenarios 
were required to demonstrate the safety of the interconnected public volumes. 
The aesthetic/economy of large open-plan spaces and unprotected steel 
structures reaches its point of clarity, though, in a series of office projects in London 
in the early 2000’s.  Plantation Place (2004), which has completely unprotected 
structural steel and unimpeded floor plates, was the first project to gain regulatory 
approval through the use of Dynamic Fire modelling, a computational system for 
modelling the way fire moves around a structure, and depending on the fire load, 
burning out before reaching the heat required to melt structural steel.  This method 
was developed by Arup’s and The University of Edinburgh as a means to replace the 
British Standard Fire Test, changing the regulatory framework from one based on a 
normative case, to one which requires bespoke modelling of every project.  The 
Heron Tower (2007-11), which again uses unprotected structural steel throughout, 
also introduces new modes of fire simulation into our regulatory frameworks.  Being 
in the design stages while Arup’s and the University of Edinburgh were conducting 
forensic research into the structural failure of the World Trade Centre, Arup’s used 
that research to demonstrate the ability of a building to withstand a fire distributed 
across multiple floors – something not previously considered by regulators – to 
argue for the Heron Tower’s innovative three-storey sky-lobbies.  The realization of 
these projects was only possible through the restructuring of existing legislation, via 
close collaboration between Arup’s, the City of London, and its fire services.  Eager 
to ensure that the Square Mile retains its particular economic competitiveness, the 
City of London were happy to require that its fire-services undertake secondments 
with Arups to ensure they understand the complexity of fire-safety solutions 
undertaken in these projects, and have changed their regulatory structures to no 
longer require adherence to conventional fire-safety standards, but make the forms 
of computational analysis pioneered by Arups mandatory on all scheme.   
 
 
 4. Engineering (in) Reflexive Modernity 
 
This story is, on the one hand, a simple one of the apparent success of Arup’s Total-
Design, demonstrating examples of the way in which architectural, engineering and 
governmental thinking have increasingly converged around concrete design 
challenges.  However, on the other, it appears to demonstrate troubling 
counterproductivities and reflexivities.  The initial promise of Fire Safety Science was 
to deliver us from the arbitrary rules of prescriptive regulation, by creating a more 
empirical basis for the definition of ‘safety’.  However, this has not been achieved.  
Fire Safety Science has not re-defined our concepts of safetyEngineers have 
developed a reputation as Value Engineers precisely because they have worked to 
remove safety features from buildings, making empirically less safe structures.   
 
 Counter to easy divisions of modernism/postmodernism, what I hope this story 
offers is an insight into the way in which architectural motif’s that we mifght 
consider ‘modernist’ have supported and been realized through governing-
mentalities we associate with post- or reflexive-modernities.   
 
The integrated design thinking organized around ambitions for structural expression 
and spatial openness have, through Fire-Safety Engineering, become materially 
associated with inititives to shift the locus of governmental expertise away from the 
state, and toward more autonomous and less accountable institutions of academia 
and international design consultancy.   
 
In doing so, they have supported discourses which have sought to dismantle 
universalist notions of social security, and have promoted cultures within which 
individuals and organisations are financially incentivised to consider their own 
particular ‘risk profiles’ and to see safety as part of a set of financial and economic 
speculations against which there are opportunities for competitive advantage and 
profit.  
 
  
Together, this has supported the re-structuring of building designs regulatory 
frameworks which, while purporting to bring enhanced safety to buldings and more 
scientific rigor to governance, has in fact worked to legitimate the design of 
increasingly more hazardous buildings, and to obscure our definitions of safety,  
construct new opportunities for design innovation within structured inequalities of 
knowledge.   
 
 
 
 
Counter-prodctivity of Fire Safety Engineering.  Failing to deliver safer buildings.  
Rather, in terms of the buildings it creates, managing to stretch margins of safety 
in order to deliver cheaper projects, or more accurately realize architects 
ambitions.  Rather than develop more empirical definitions of safety, its work 
involves imaginative ways of working creatively within existing margins of 
safety, creating the ability to design trade-offs which work within a context of 
uncertainty.  Rather than achieve a more robust regulatory framework, UoE and 
Arups work is pushing toward greater de-regulation, to the recognition of 
‘Safety’ as a design-load factor.  
 
Obvious individual academic and economic self-interests here, but these 
developments also follow broader governmental logics.  Meta-engineering of 
regulatory context, Arups is furthering the devolution nof government, away fro 
the instruments of state, and toward the parastatal bodies of Universities and 
international corporations (much as Keynes suggested devolution of fiscal 
control away from government?).  By suggesting we think of Safety as a ‘design 
load’, a commodity we may wish to have more or less of, feeds into two 
contemporary questions of subjectification; What Foucault would call 
governmentalities of ‘security’, whereby our individual feelings of insecurity are 
harnessed as a mode of subjectification, but also a trend toward the marketised 
and speculative; working as clients or designers within this de-regulated context 
we are no longer confronted with blanket safety requirements, but given the 
opportunity to situate ourselves and our building occupants on ‘risk spectrums’.  
Meta-engineering of FSE is geared towards creating a kind of productive 
uncertainty, that operates technically and architecturally, economically, but also 
subjectively. 
 
 
   
 
 
                                                        
i Rem Koolhaas and Office for Metropolitan Architecture, Content (Köln: Taschen, 
2004). 
 
ii Arups notion of ‘Total Design’ refers to his ambition to think beyond the 
opposition of engineering and architecture, which had been formalised legally in 
the UK in 1918, 5 years before Arup’s arrival.  The ambition to find synergies 
between architectural and engineering thinking has a chequered history in 
Arup’s own portfolio; projects such as the Sydney Opera House, for instance, 
could be seen as evidence either for or against this ambition.  This paper 
suggests – in a way that echoes Duta’s work – that the history of the firm’s work 
provides a kind of ‘working through’ of the ambition to dissolve the relation 
between the two disciplines, one which has sometimes contradictory results. See 
‘Engineering Timelines - Ove Arup - Total Design’, accessed 28 February 2016, 
http://www.engineering-timelines.com/who/arup_O/arupOve11.asp. 
 
iii The notion of meta-engineering is was perhaps first defined by Dennett in the 
context of cybernetics and theories of evolution.  Dennett defines the term as 
“the investigation of the most general constraints on the processes that can lead to 
the creation and reproduction of designed things”.  It therefore connotes, not the 
design of things, but the design of designing methods, as well as the design of the 
conditions of applicability for designed products.  Daniel C. Dennett, Darwin’s 
Dangerous Idea: Evolution and the Meanings of Life, New Ed edition (Penguin, 
1996). 
 
iv Governing by Design : Architecture, Economy, and Politics in the Twentieth 
Century / Aggregate ; Contributors, Daniel Abramson, Lucia Allais, Arindam Dutta, 
John Harwood, Timothy Hyde, Pamela Karimi, Jonathan Massey, Ijlal Muzaffar, 
Michael Osman, Meredith Tenhoor, Culture, Politics, and the Built Environment 
(Pittsburgh, Pa. : University of Pittsburgh Press, [2012], 2012). 
 
v Dutta refers to a 2004 paper – “Review of the Publicity Requirements for 
Planning Applications” – commissioned and published by the Office of the 
Deputy Prime Minister, authored by Arups.  The paper, Dutta notes, is intended 
to “determine if the current statutory requrements for publicizing applications 
for planning permissions, listed building and conservation area consent are 
effective and offer value for money” (Author’s italics) 
vi Reference Ewald on ‘technologies of solidarity’ 
vii Insert reference to Law’s ‘Magic Numbers’ here. 
